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We analyze a society that cares about inequality of opportunity. We propose a 
dynamic setting in which effort is a decision variable that individuals adopt as a 
solution of an explicit utility maximization program. Effort determines the 
monetary outcome and it depends on the individual’s preferences and 
circumstances. The planner designs an incentive scheme so as to foster higher 
incomes, reducing the opportunity cost of effort and productivity for the less 
favoured agents. Income is assumed to be random, and contrary to the general 
neutral assumption, we obtain that luck does have a biased and persistent effect on 
income distribution that may be regarded as unfair. We also study the planner’s 
optimal policy when she cannot infer perfectly the individuals’ responsibility 
feature. 
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3 1 Introduction
The purpose of the present paper is to study the equality of opportunity approach
in a dynamic context in which today￿ s outcome is a random variable (a function
of initial endowment, ability and luck, so to speak) that may a⁄ect tomorrow￿ s
achievements.
The model involves a social planner, a ￿nite set of heterogeneous agents, and
a ￿nite time span. The planner aims at implementing an equality of opportunity
policy by means of monetary transfers. Contrary to the usual equality of opportunity
models, we consider that every individual adopts her e⁄ort decision as a solution of
an explicit intertemporal maximization problem depending on an environment that
includes the policy. Her decisions result in certain outcomes that we associate with
personal income. First, we determine the factors that characterize the individual￿ s
optimal choice of e⁄ort. Second, we study the planner￿ s policy that aims at providing
equal opportunity within the society.
Here we introduce into the traditional equality of opportunity framework two
features that have been barely studied. First, we consider a non-deterministic set-
up in which investment today implies higher expected future gains. Second, we
address the problem as a repeated game. To the best of my knowledge, the dynamic
approach is something that is completely missing within equality of opportunity
literature.
Equality of opportunity policies aim at reducing inequality between individu-
als with respect to the access to some basic goods or services: income, education,
health, etc. The implementation of these policies requires de￿ning properly "equal-
ity of what" and ￿nding ways of measuring it. There has been a long and fruitful
debate on those aspects in the last years, involving di⁄erent kinds of social scientists
(see Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Sen (1985), Cohen (1989) and Arneson
(1989) or Roemer (1993, 1998) among others).1 A central conclusion is that di⁄er-
ences in individual outcomes cannot be the only reference for an egalitarian policy.
1See also Roemer (1996), Fleurbaey (1996), Peragine (2000, 2002), Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2001), Ruiz Castillo (2003), Villar (2005), Calo-Blanco & Villar (2008).
4The reason is that some of those di⁄erences are morally acceptable whereas some
others are not, depending on the conditioning variables that originate the outcomes.
The notion of equality of opportunity tries to capture this distinction by taking
into account how individual outcomes depend on both agents￿personal decisions
(responsibility) and agents￿external circumstances (opportunity). Following John
Roemer￿ s terminology we call e⁄ort to the set of variables related to the agents￿
responsibility and circumstances to that related to opportunity. The key ethical el-
ement is that individuals cannot be held accountable for that part of their outcomes
derived from their circumstances. Therefore, in a fair society similar e⁄orts should
yield similar outcomes, no matter the agents￿circumstances.
The design of an egalitarian policy of this kind calls for a social consensus on
the allocation of individuals￿traits into the "e⁄ort" and "circumstances" categories,
and involves particular value judgements that clearly condition the meaning of the
results one obtains. The standard approach is to select a speci￿c set of variables
that de￿ne "opportunity" and treat "e⁄ort" as a residual variable that encompasses
all those aspects that are not part of the external circumstances. This strategy
raises two di¢ cult subjects: The measurement of e⁄ort and the treatment of other
variables that a⁄ect the agents￿outcomes (luck in particular). Roemer proposes a
way to deal with the measurement di¢ culty, provided e⁄ort is a one-dimensional
variable and outcomes are monotonically related to it. If the society is partitioned
into types (sets of individuals with similar external circumstances), it can be said
that two individuals exert a comparable degree of e⁄ort whenever they belong to
the same quantile in the outcome distribution of their corresponding types.
Regarding the second di¢ culty, how should luck be dealt with from an equality
of opportunity viewpoint?2 Luck is typically subsumed within the e⁄ort variable
so that outcomes are treated as deterministic and the equality of opportunity pol-
icy does not compensate for randomness. What is usually argued to defend this
idea is that individuals who exert a comparable degree of e⁄ort are facing the same
prospects of success (ex-ante lotteries), regardless of their external circumstances.
2We refer implicitly here to what Dworkin calls brute luck (lotteries that an individual cannot
escape from), as we place in the realm of circumstances all those random factors that determine
each individual￿ s family background, genetic endowment, etc.
5Therefore, outcome di⁄erences due to luck are ethically acceptable.3 A key point
is that the introduction of luck makes the use of quantiles impossible to compare
e⁄ort degrees, since the monotone relationship assumption does not hold any longer.
Therefore, the planner has incomplete information about individuals￿level of respon-
sibility, and the planner faces a type of principal-agent situation when designing the
equality of opportunity policy.
The previous interpretation of the e⁄ect of the luck factor on outcome seems
much less compelling in a dynamic setting. In this context the particular realization
of the random variable on the initial stages may have a relevant impact on agents
that may be regarded as unfair. In order to motivate the previous idea let us put
forward the following example. Let us suppose a Ph.D. student that is run over by
an irresponsible driver. Because of the severity of the injures she cannot attend the
job market meetings, and hence she cannot apply for a job in the best institutions
in order to develop her research skills. Therefore, her future outcome (publications
here) is clearly a⁄ected in the long run for the external shock (the irresponsible
driver). Gladwell (2008) collects many similar real examples to this one proposed
by us. In one of them it is argued that something as fortuitous as the month in
which a hockey player is born may a⁄ect seriously his future sports career. Since
adolescents born earlier in the year are bigger and more developmentally advanced
than the others, they are often identi￿ed as better athletes, leading to extra coaching
and a higher likelihood of being selected for elite hockey leagues.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic ingredients of
the model. We characterize the individual￿ s intertemporal e⁄ort decision under
a nonexistent (or constant) public funding policy. We shall assume that higher
e⁄ort levels are associated with higher expected labour incomes. We obtain that
luck appears as an element that explains the resulting income distribution, as the
previous realizations of the random variable a⁄ects the present transformation of
3Lefranc et al (2007) provide a model in which outcomes are explicitly generated by three
di⁄erent determinants: e⁄ort, circumstances and luck. What those authors propose is that equality
of opportunity "arises when the outcome distributions conditional on e⁄ort cannot be ranked using
￿rst and second order stochastic dominance criteria". See also Peragine and Serlenga (2007).
4This example is due to Barnsley et al. (1985).
6e⁄ort into income. We also relate our result to the standard ones in the literature.
Section 3 introduces a social planner that is concerned about inequality of op-
portunity. Speci￿cally, this planner￿ s designs a system of monetary transfers aims
at equalizing the monetary outcomes of those agents who exert a comparable degree
of e⁄ort (the so-called e⁄ort group). Such a policy a⁄ects the individuals￿optimal
e⁄ort decision and hence the overall income distribution. As usual, the optimal
opportunity policy implies compensations just within e⁄ort groups. Moreover, in
our setting it provides some compensation for the luck factor, as the planner tries
to smooth down its e⁄ect on income distribution.
Last section summarizes the main conclusions. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The basic model
To facilitate the discussion we analyze ￿rst the behaviour of individual agents in the
absence of a social planner.
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a society with a ￿nite number of individual agents, M = f1;2;:::;m:::;Mg.
Individuals are heterogeneous concerning their preferences (responsibility) and their
types (circumstances). They make decisions in an ￿nite horizon dynamic setting that
involve a utility cost (e⁄ort) and result in a monetary outcome that is a random
variable.
Individual agents are classed into types according to their initial circumstances.
Here we consider that any individual￿ s initial endowment consists of a given amount
of monetary resources (present wealth), w 2 W = fw;:::;wg. We denote by M(w)
the set of agents of type w; for w = 1;2;:::;j:::;J. The e⁄ort level chosen by agent
m is a real number e e in the closed interval [e eL
w;e eH
w]; that is type dependent.
We assume that the outcome space for all individuals is a set X with ￿nite
support. We write X = fx1;x2;:::;xi;:::;xng, for xi 2 R+; in the understanding
7that those outcomes are ranked in an increasing order: x1 < x2 < ::: < xi < ::: <
xn. Each point of the outcome space is a stochastic function of individual e⁄ort,
environmental variables and personal characteristics. We assume that all agents
have the same a priori distribution over that random variable.
The economic process that transforms e⁄ort into income is summarized here by a
probability distribution on the monetary outcomes, conditional on the agent￿ s e⁄ort
and characteristics. The underlying idea is that e⁄ort is chosen by the individuals
according to their preferences whereas the initial wealth (the type) determines the
way in which e⁄ort translates into outcomes in terms of a particular probability
distribution.
We can write the conditional probability of obtaining income xi by an agent m
of type w as follows:




pi (e e;w) = 1: This conditional probability is required to satisfy the following
properties:
(i) Monotone likelihood ratio condition: For each given w, the functions fpi (e e;w)g
n
i=1
are such that e e ￿ e e0 implies that pi (e e;w)=pi (e e0;w) is non-increasing in i.
(ii) Convexity of the distribution function condition (cdfc): The functions fpj (e e;w)g
N
j=1
are such that F 00
j (e e;w) is nonnegative for every j 2 f1;:::;Ng all e e;w, where
Fj (e e;w) =
Pj
i=1 pi (e e;w).
Monotonicity is telling us that the higher the level of e⁄ort the higher the prob-
ability of obtaining a higher income. Such a condition implies that fpi (e e0;w)g ￿rst
order stochastically dominates fpi (e e;w)g. Finally, Property (ii) requires that the
function decreases at a decreasing rate, that is, the cdfc is a form of stochastic
diminishing returns to scale.
Let pH
i (w) := pi(e eH
w;w); pL
i (w) := pi(e eL
w;w) denote the probability of obtaining
income xi by an agent of type w when she exerts the maximum and the minim
level of e⁄ort, respectively. In view of the monotone likelihood ratio condition, the
8conditional probability of obtaining income xi by agent m can be rewritten as:
pi (e e;w) = ep
H
i (w) + (1 ￿ e)p
L
i (w) (2)
where e 2 [0;1]; with e = 1 i⁄e e = eH
w and e = 0 i⁄e e = eL
w: The monotonicity of the
likelihood ratio ensures a one to one relationship between e em and e; so that e can
be understood as the agent￿ s degree of e⁄ort (the percentage of the maximal e⁄ort,
conditional on her type).













Note that, under the conditions established, expected income is an increasing func-
tion of e⁄ort for all types. The extent to which e⁄ort translates into expected
income depends on the agent￿ s current initial wealth and is re￿ ected in the agent￿ s
probability distribution.
The next step is to model how the agent decides her optimal e⁄ort.
2.2 Optimal e⁄ort decision
Following the approach in Calo-Blanco & Villar (2008) we take e⁄ort as a decision
variable that each individual chooses as the solution of an explicit utility maximiza-
tion program.
We assume that the utility function of agent m depends positively on the total
current income and negatively on the e⁄ort in a separable way. This can be expressed
as follows: agent m of type w that obtains an income xi at point t; with a degree of
e⁄ort em(t), gets a utility:
Um (w(t);em(t)) = um (xi) ￿ cm (em(t)) (4)
8t 2 [0;T] and for some end-point T; with the usual derivative signs: u0 (￿) > 0;
u00 (￿) ￿ 0; c0 (￿) > 0; c00 (￿) > 0. That is, utility is increasing and concave whilst the
9cost of e⁄ort is increasing and convex. Additionally, we assume that to make the
maximum level of e⁄ort is extremely costly for the agent, that is c0 (0) = 0;c0 (1) =
+1.
For the sake of simplicity in exposition, we take a utility function that is linear
in income and a strictly convex in e⁄ort. More speci￿cally we shall use the following
formulation:
um (xi) = xi (5)
cm (em(t)) = (1 ￿ em(t))
￿￿m ￿ 1
where ￿m ￿ 0 is a parameter that measures the personal disutility of e⁄ort (the
personal responsibility feature). The higher the value of ￿m, the higher the disutility
of making a certain level of e⁄ort. The utility function is chosen so as to make
computations operational. The speci￿c form of the e⁄ort cost function ensures that
the optimal e⁄ort decision is between 0 and 1.
Each individual has a working life of T periods, and she has to decide the in-
tertemporal choice of e⁄ort that maximizes her present and future earnings. The
individual derives utility from the consumption of a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of her total
present income, whereas a fraction ￿ is saved as initial wealth for the next period.
The individual takes into account that her current wealth w(t) determines her ex-
pected present income.
The problem that any individual faces at the time of making her intertemporal
choice is that she is adopting the decision according to expected values. Therefore, at
the beginning of every period the individual has to redesign her optimal intertem-
poral choice for the remaining periods, incorporating the new available pieces of
information. At any period t 2 [0;T] the individual decides her optimal current







(1 ￿ ￿)[xm(em(s);wm (s))] ￿ (1 ￿ em(s))
￿￿m ￿ 1
￿
s:t: : em(s) 2 [0;1]
wm (s + 1) = ￿[xm (em(s);wm (s))]
wm (0) = wm
0 ;8m 2 M
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
(6)
10Proposition 1 The individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort decision at any period t 2 [0;T] is
given by the following expression:
e
￿










where ki (wm (t))= pH
i (wm (t))￿pL










Proof. The proof is in appendix A.
According to expression 7 we ￿nd that at any period t 2 [0;T], the higher the
expected present or the discounted future gains (measured here through parameter
￿t), the higher the level of e⁄ort made by the agent. It is also easy to check that
there is a direct relationship between the individual￿ s optimal choice of e⁄ort and her
level of responsibility (i.e., e￿
m decreases with ￿m).5 Therefore, part of the observed
income distribution derives from the di⁄erences in the individuals￿disutility of e⁄ort
(a responsibility feature) and can be regarded as socially fair. Implicit in the solution
is the role of the initial wealth wm (t). Higher levels of wealth increase the probability
of obtaining higher income because they a⁄ect to the agents opportunity cost of e⁄ort
and productivity through the income probability distribution. The third element
that explains the resulting income distribution is luck: the realization of the random
variables that determine the transformation of e⁄ort into income, and hence luck has
an in￿ uence on income distribution. This e⁄ect comes from the transformation of
previous incomes in present wealth. In summary: the income an agent gets depends
on circumstances, personal choices, and luck.
As long as the sort of luck experienced in the past a⁄ects the individual￿ s optimal
behaviour in the long run through the endogenous determination of e⁄ort, we argue
that the luck factor does call for social compensation, as agents cannot be held
accountable for that factor.
One could point out that given that individuals are facing a sort of problem of
uncertainty in income, they could completely avoid bad luck just by taking fully
insurance about the ￿nal income. This would work out in the case in which there
5See appendix A.
11is no connection between luck and future income. Actually, the insurance can be
understood as an explanation of the usual neutral e⁄ect of uncertainty assumption in
the previous literature. However, our line of reasoning here is that the introduction
of an insurance market will not solve the problem. The idea is that if any individual
is su⁄ering an initial series of bad luck, the insurance ￿rm would understand the
individual￿ s bad results as a signal of a low level of responsibility. Therefore, the
insurance ￿rm would charge the individual with a higher premium, even tough she
is behaving appropriately.
Remark 2.1 If the individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort decision depends on the previous re-
alizations of the monetary outcome, the luck factor will have then a biased and per-
sistent e⁄ect on income. Therefore, such a factor does call for social compensation
in order to ensure equality of opportunity.
Finally, our result is closely related to previous features obtained in the literature.
Let us consider a very simpli￿ed version of the model in which there is neither a
link between periods nor a discount factor (i.e., ￿ = 1). For instance, we can think
that the initial set of external circumstances is given by variables like race, gender,
family social background and natural skills, among others, and therefore it remains
















which is constant for all periods, independently of the previous realizations of the
random variable. Note that this is equivalent to assume that individuals perform
a constant level of e⁄ort that is exogenously given. It is a well-known result in
the literature that if there is no uncertainty in the model and the level of e⁄ort is
constant, it is possible to infer perfectly the individual￿ s responsibility feature after
just one period. What we propose here is an extension of this usual result to the
case in which the ￿nal income is random. Speci￿cally, we propose the following:
Corollary 2.1 Under incomplete information, if individuals are making a constant
12level of e⁄ort, the planner can infer exactly (after a ￿nite number of periods) the
individuals￿level of responsibility by means of a simple updating of beliefs process.
Proof. The proof is in appendix B.
Roughly speaking, this result can be understood as a sort of extension of the
Roemer￿ s solution to the case in which the e⁄ort decision cannot be either observed
or perfectly inferred.
3 The Planner
In the previous section we have analyzed the individual￿ s optimal choice of e⁄ort in
the absence of a funding policy. Now we proceed to analyze such optimal behaviour
when a social planner that cares about inequality of opportunity is introduced in
the model. Such a planner designs a system of monetary transfers that aims at
equalizing the monetary outcomes of those agents who exert a comparable degree of
e⁄ort. As e⁄ort is not observable and incomes are random, the planner has to infer
the individuals￿level of responsibility updating her beliefs according to the observed
monetary outcomes and the information on agents￿characteristics. Money transfers
vary, therefore, according to the messages received by the planner concerning the
e⁄ort exerted by the agents.
We assume that the planner can identify the agents￿current initial wealth and
also that she observes the individual incomes and knows their probability distri-
butions. She will use that information to estimate the agents￿e⁄ort levels and
implement the equality of opportunity policy.
At the end of every period the planner adjusts her beliefs about the individuals￿
level of responsibility according to the available pieces of information. Although
the monetary outcome is random and the planner cannot observe the responsibility
feature, it is only natural to think that the planner expects from any individual a
level of income that should be in accordance with her initial circumstances and the
level of e⁄ort that she is making.
13Because of the uncertainty of income, the planner realizes that sometimes the
agent does not achieve the income that was expected from her although she was
behaving appropriately. Therefore, in order to mitigate the e⁄ect of luck on subse-
quent incomes the planner aims at smoothing down the e⁄ect of initial results on
subsequent outcomes.
We de￿ne gm (t) as a function that summarizes the principal￿ s beliefs about all
her past experiences with agent m up to period t, to be understood as assessments of
individual m￿ s disutility of e⁄ort. Those beliefs can be used to rank all individuals
belonging to any type in connection with the responsibility feature, that is, ￿m.
Once this classi￿cation has been made for all types, the planner would have a tool
to make e⁄ort comparisons between individuals.6
Since the beliefs function summarizes all interactions between the planner and
the individual, the realization of previous incomes (that includes the sort of luck
experienced in the past) will a⁄ect the current beliefs as well. Consequently, every
agent chooses an intertemporal e⁄ort decision that varies according to her current
environment and the planner￿ s funding policy, which is a function of the individual￿ s
reputation.
According to the previous description every individual m 2 M makes at time
t 2 [0;T] a level of e⁄ort that maximizes her present and future gains, taking into
account that her decision will a⁄ect the future beliefs about her, and hence her









xm (￿;s) + gm (s)￿wm(s)￿
￿ (1 ￿ em (s))
￿￿m ￿ 1
￿
s:t: : em(s) 2 [0;1]
wm (s + 1) = ￿x(￿;s)
wm (0) = wm
0 ;8m 2 M
gm (s + 1) ￿ gm (s) = f (x(￿;s))
gm (0) = g0
m 2 R+
9
> > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > ;
(9)
where f (￿) is a function that de￿nes how the planner updates her beliefs. The
6Needless to say, when the policy is based on the planner￿ s beliefs the result will di⁄er from
that one obtained under complete information. However, as the lack of information cannot be
completely solved the present solution has to be understood as a second best solution.
14individual￿ s present utility function is given by the utility of the expected income plus
the monetary incentive received from the planner in that speci￿c period according
to her present wealth, gm (s)￿wm(s). Such a subsidy is scaled down by the planner￿ s
beliefs about the individual￿ s level of responsibility. Moreover, the individual takes
into account that the e⁄ect of e⁄ort has an additional feature, as the current level
of e⁄ort a⁄ects the individual￿ s future reputation, and hence it a⁄ects her future
utility as well. This problem has the following solution:
Proposition 2 The individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort decision at any period t 2 [0;T] in
system 9 is given by the following expression:
e
￿








































Proof. The proof is in appendix A.
Likewise in the previous section, we obtain that the optimal e⁄ort decision is
positively related with both the level of responsibility and the initial wealth. The
di⁄erence between this e⁄ort decision and the optimal choice of e⁄ort in equation
7 is the last terms of the denominator. Such terms indicates the future earnings of
making a higher e⁄ort due to the incentive mechanism. These gains are twofold.
On the one hand, a higher level of e⁄ort today will imply a better reputation in
the future. On the other hand, a present higher level of e⁄ort implies a higher
future initial wealth, and therefore indirect future improvements in the individual￿ s
reputation. In other words, these values are the future gains that the individual
can get if she is investing today in building up a better reputation. Note that such
an expression is decreasing in time, that is, the fewer the number of remaining
periods to take advantage of the own reputation, the lower the expected gains of
15investing in it, an hence the lower the incentive to exert oneself. Again, the individual
adapts her optimal choice to the current environment including the luck that she
has experienced up to that period.
We also observe that the e⁄ort decision is increasing in the monetary incentive as
it reduces the opportunity cost of e⁄ort and productivity. The value of this variable
is actually chosen by the planner, so that she can use it to have an in￿ uence on the
individual￿ s ￿nal income. This can be understood as the way in which the planner
makes social compensations.
Remark 3.1 The social planner can implement an incentive scheme so as to have
an in￿uence on the determination of the agents￿e⁄ort choices. That in￿uence can
be used as an instrument to implement an egalitarian policy.
Finally, we proceed to characterize the funding policy of an egalitarian planner
that every period ￿xes the current incentive scheme.7 As we said before, this planner
hopes to equalize the current ￿nal income of all of those individuals that she "be-
lieves" that present a similar degree of responsibility, regardless their initial wealth,
that is:
De￿nition 3.1 There is equality of opportunity in the society if and only if 8m;m0 2
M : gm (t) = gm0 (t) the following condition holds:
xm ((em (t))
￿) = xm0 ((em0 (t))
￿)
Here we assume that the planner considers that two individuals belong to the
same type j if both have the same level of current wealth wj (t). Note that this level
of wealth is a function of both opportunity and responsibility factors. However,
we know that in a fair society two individuals with the same level of responsibility
must end up with the same level of wealth, therefore the planner must compensate
individuals for any income di⁄erence between both. It can be asserted that there is
equality of opportunity in the society if and only if:
7In this case individuals must adopt their decisions according to some current expectations
about the future incentive scheme.
16Proposition 3 There is equality of opportunity in the society if and only if 8m;m0 2




































ki (wm (t))xi [1 + ￿t + ￿t] + ￿t
￿
and b ￿t;m is the level of
disutility of e⁄ort that in period t the planner guesses from agent m.
Proof. The proof is in appendix A.
Since the planner thinks that both agents are similar with respect to their level
of disutility, it must be the case that b ￿t;m = b ￿t;m0 = b ￿t.8 We have previously shown
that the ￿nal income is directly related to both the external circumstances and the
public incentive. If there is no public policy we have that for any pair of levels of
wealth wm (t) > wm0 (t), the left hand side of expression 11 is bigger because of the
higher probability of obtaining larger incomes. As those individuals are supposed to
be identical with respect to the responsibility feature, their income di⁄erences must
be considered socially unfair. Therefore, in order to equalize the expected income
of both individuals at period t the principal must provide the "poorest" individual
with a higher fraction of public funds. That is, the planner has to make monetary
transfers within e⁄ort groups, compensations that will depend on the initial wealth,
the agents￿of disutility of e⁄ort, and the sort of luck experienced in the past.
Note that we are considering that ￿wj(t) is equal for all individuals with current
initial wealth j. Therefore, all individuals with the same external circumstances are





m0 = ￿wj(t). However, as the planner can use her current beliefs to treat individ-
uals di⁄erently, the actual incentive received by each on of them will be di⁄erent.
More precisely, the money received by each one of them would be gm (t)￿wj(t) and
gm0 (t)￿wj(t), respectively. Consequently, the planner ￿nds fairest to provide the
most diligent workers with a higher fraction of public monetary resources.
8Assuming that ￿ is equally distributed between types.
17Remark 3.2 The equal opportunity feature is concerned about income inequalities
within e⁄ort groups, whereas income di⁄erences between these groups only repre-
sent diverse rewards of people￿ s autonomous choices and will not be consider unfair.
Moreover, the planner reveals a certain concern for the aggregate welfare as a sec-
ondary objective.
The planner that implements an equality of opportunity policy that maximizes
















(1 ￿ b e￿
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1+b ￿t;m ;8m 2 M
xm(b e￿
m (t)) = xm0(b e￿
m0 (t));8m;m0 2 M : gm (t) = gm0 (t)
9
> > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > ;
(12)
where ￿ 2 R+ is the planner￿ s budget constraint. If this value is strictly greater than
0 it means that the planner possesses a certain amount of exogenously given mon-
etary resources to implement the equality of opportunity policy. If on the contrary
we require that the equality of opportunity policy is budget balanced (i.e., ￿ = 0)
all the necessary resources to implement the policy must come from the very agents.
Then, some of the incentives must be negative, that is, some individuals are being
taxed so as to subsidize the rest of the citizens.9
4 Concluding remarks
Nowadays equality of opportunity is considered as one of the fairest principle at the
time of evaluating outcome and opportunity, and hence it becomes extremely impor-
tant to de￿ne properly the aspects that call for compensation. We have presented a











18model in which, like in Calo-Blanco & Villar (2008), the individual choice of e⁄ort is
considered as a decision variable that individuals adopt as a solution of an explicit
utility maximization program. This decision determines the individual￿ s monetary
outcome, which is assumed to be random. Such an optimal choice depends on dif-
ferent factors like the individuals￿environment (initial wealth and the distribution
of probabilities), their preferences (singularized here by the disutility of making a
level of e⁄ort) and the public funding policy (considered as monetary incentives to
foster higher incomes).
The introduction of luck through the uncertainty of income exhibits here very
interesting features. The standard models in the literature assume that e⁄ect of luck
on income is even-handed across types, and hence it does not call for social com-
pensation.10 Nevertheless, if we consider that the realization of previous outcomes
may have some in￿ uence on subsequent outcomes, it is not possible to assume this
neutral e⁄ect of luck on income any longer.
We have presented a dynamic setting in which the individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort
decision, and hence her ￿nal income is a function of her responsibility and her cir-
cumstances, as such variables reduce the opportunity cost of making a certain level
of e⁄ort. We have found that the individual￿ s ￿nal income is also a function of
the sort of luck that she has experienced in the past, as it a⁄ects the individual￿ s
transformation of e⁄ort into income. The key point is that a negative series of bad
luck in the initial stages can negatively determine the individual￿ s future circum-
stances, and hence her future incomes, to a large extent, regardless her personal
traits. From our viewpoint, any equality of opportunity policy should also aim to
compensate individuals for outcome di⁄erences that come from the di⁄erent kind of
luck experienced in the past.
Next, we have introduced a social planner that is concerned about inequality in
opportunity terms. She can alter the agents￿optimal e⁄ort decision, and hence the
income distribution, in order to equalize opportunity among individuals. In the case
10From our viewpoint, this line of argument it is quite debatable. For instance, the possibility
of having a road crash is, in principle, independent of the individual￿ s external circumstances.
However, the ￿nal outcome (the severity of the injures) is clearly dependent on the individual￿ s
circumstances, as expensive cars are usually safer than cheap ones.
19in which the planner does not have complete information about individuals￿level of
responsibility, she can use an updating of beliefs mechanism so as to implement a
second best policy. Moreover, the planner aims at smoothing down the e⁄ect of luck
on income distribution, especially for the initial periods, which strongly determines
the subsequent behaviours.
The characterization of the optimal funding policy states that the planner must
make compensations just within e⁄ort groups. On the contrary, any di⁄erence be-
tween such groups is exclusively given to responsibility features, and hence does not
call for social compensation. Additionally, such an optimal policy yields a certain
concern for the aggregate welfare of the society.
In the introduction of the present paper we have put forward two examples of
how luck can a⁄ect the individual￿ s outcome in a repeated game. Once the problem
have been analyzed in depth, we can argue now that both the Ph.D. student and
the hockey player should be compensated in order to help them to develop their own
abilities. For the former, the ministry of education can provide the student with a
post doctoral fellowship to visit the institution that best ￿ts her research interests.
For the latter, a possible solution is to have a rotating eligible date, something that
the Canadian Hockey Association has been discussing about.
Finally, we want to stress the importance of the dynamic approach in terms of
e¢ ciency. We have obtained that the sooner the public compensation, the higher the
e⁄ect of the funding policy and the cheaper the monetary cost for the society. This
result is extremely important for outcomes like education or health. For instance,
it is very well known that the investment in education has a deeper impact on the
students￿future success if it is done in the earlier stages of education. Likewise, a
patient that is su⁄ering any serious illness will have more chances to fully recover
from it if she receives an early treatment.
20A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. At any period t 2 [0;T] the individual decides her choice of e⁄ort as the solu-
tion of the intertemporal program for the remaining periods T ￿t. This is equivalent







(1 ￿ ￿)x(￿;s) ￿ (1 ￿ em (s))
￿￿m ￿ 1
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9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
The previous problem has the following Hamiltonian function:
H = ￿
s ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)x(￿;s) ￿ (1 ￿ em (s))
￿￿m ￿ 1
￿
+￿ (s + 1)￿x(￿;s)
with the following ￿rst order conditions:
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￿
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where ki (wm (s)) = pH
i (wm (s))￿pL
i (wm (s)). In the second order condition we can
solve for the optimal value of the costate variable ￿ (s). This equation of di⁄erences




























bj; s = 1;:::;T ￿ t + 1:
where ￿0 is a certain constant and bj = ￿
j (1￿￿)
￿ . As the value function ends at
T ￿ t, an increase in wm (T ￿ t) cannot a⁄ect the payo⁄, so that the transversality

























Substituting this value into the ￿rst order condition to eliminate the costate variable:
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Note that the previous solution is de￿ned for a time span [0;T ￿ t]. Therefore we
need to scale it adding t periods and ￿xing s = 0, that is, the optimal solution for
a particular t = 0;:::;T would become:
e
￿
















22This expression would give us the individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort decision at any period
t 2 [0;T]. Therefore, we would have that 8t = 0;:::;T the optimal e⁄ort decision
chosen by the agent would be:
e
￿















Additionally, we have that wm (t) can be written as a function all previous income
realizations from t = 0. More precisely, it can be rewritten as wm (t) = ￿x(t ￿ 1),
where x(t ￿ 1) is the realization of income in period t ￿ 1, which is determined as
a stochastic function of the individual￿ s traits at period t ￿ 1, that is, wm (t) =
￿￿t￿1 [wm (t ￿ 1);￿m], where ￿t￿1 is that stochastic function. Likewise, we can
rewrite wm (t) as wm (t) = ￿￿t￿1 [￿x(t ￿ 2);￿m] = ￿￿t￿1
￿
￿￿t￿2 [wm (t ￿ 2);￿m];￿m
￿
.
We can continue such a decomposition up to t = 0, and hence for the shake of sim-
plicity we can rewrite the previous expression as: wm (t) = ￿(wm
0 ;￿m;￿). That is,
the individual￿ s present wealth is a stochastic function of both her initial endowment
and her level of responsibility. Therefore, the presence of uncertainty in the model
has a biased and persistent e⁄ect on the individual￿ s present labour income. Finally,
if we consider a natural model in which individuals have always incentives to work,
we have to assume that the disutility of e⁄ort is not arbitrarily large, more precisely,











￿ ￿m, that is,
at least up to some extent it must be pro￿table to make a non-negative level of
e⁄ort.
A.2 Relationship between e￿
m (t) and ￿m



























. As we are assuming that
￿ ￿ ￿m the the sign of the derivative is inevitably negative, which implies our
previous statement between optimal e⁄ort and responsibility.
23A.3 Proposition 2





x(￿;s) + g (s)￿
wm(s)￿
￿ (1 ￿ em (s))
￿￿m ￿ 1
￿
+￿ (s + 1)￿x(￿;s) + ￿(s + 1)(gm (s) + f (x(￿;s)))
with the following ￿rst order conditions:
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= ￿(s) = ￿
s (1 ￿ ￿)￿
wm(s) + ￿(s + 1)
@H
@￿ (s + 1)
= w(s + 1) = ￿[wm (s) + x(￿;s)]
@H
@￿(s + 1)
= g (s + 1) = gm (s) + f (x(￿;s))
where ki (￿) = pH
i (￿) ￿ pL
i (￿). In the third order condition we can solve for the
optimal value of the costate variable ￿(t). This equation of di⁄erences has the
following solution:





wm(j); s = 1;:::;T ￿ t + 1:
where C1 is a certain constant. As the value function ends at T ￿ t, an increase in
gm (T ￿ t) cannot a⁄ect the payo⁄, so that the transversality condition has a free end
















wm(j); s = 1;:::;T ￿ t + 1:
Now we can substitute this result in the second foc, and we would get:
























￿ (s + 1) =
￿ (s)
￿
￿ bs;s = 0;:::;T ￿ t
This ￿rst order condition can be solved for the optimal value of the costate variable













bj; s = 1;:::;T ￿ t + 1:
where ￿0 is a certain constant. As the value function ends at T ￿ t, an increase
in wm (T ￿ t) cannot a⁄ect the payo⁄, so that the transversality condition has a










































































￿ (s) into the ￿rst foc to eliminate the costate variable:
￿
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ki (wm (s))xi [1 + ￿s + ￿s] + ￿s
￿￿ ￿1
(￿m+1)
25Note that the previous solution is de￿ned 8s = 0;:::;T ￿ t. Therefore we need to
scale it adding t periods and ￿xing s = 0, that is:
e
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This expression would give us the individual￿ s optimal e⁄ort decision at any period
t 2 [0;T].If we consider a natural model in which individuals have always incentives
to work, we have to assume that the disutility of e⁄ort is not arbitrarily large, more




ki (wm (t))xi [1 + ￿t + ￿t] + ￿t
￿
￿
￿m, that is, at least up to some extent it must be pro￿table to make a non-negative
level of e⁄ort.
A.4 Proposition 3
Proof. By de￿nition, there is EOp if and only if 8m;m0 2 M : gm (t) = gm0 (t)
it holds that xm ((em (t))
￿) = xm0 ((em0 (t))
￿). If we substitute the planner￿ s be-
liefs about the level of e⁄ort that individuals are currently making in the previous
equation, we obtain expression 11.
B Appendix: Proof of corollary 2.1
For any type w 2 W let us consider a model with just two feasible levels of income
x 2 X = fA;Bg, where A > B, and two di⁄erent disutility of e⁄ort J = f￿h;￿lg,
with ￿h < ￿l.11 Therefore, we can write the probability of obtaining the high income
11For instance, this can be understood as if we split all feasible incomes in two, the high ones
and the low ones. The same can be done for the responsibility feature.
26conditional to the disutility of e⁄ort as: pw
t (A j ￿h) = ￿ > ￿ = pw
t (A j ￿l). Using
Bayes￿rule it is straightforward to check that the planner￿ s ratio of beliefs about



















where #A and #B are the number of times that income A and B comes up respec-
tively after T periods, and fpw
0 (￿h);pw
0 (￿l)g are the planner￿ s priors. The higher
the value of the ratio, the higher the planner￿ s beliefs that such an agent is "hard-
working". The right hand side of equation 13 includes the ratio of planner￿ s priors









> 1, and hence the total value of the ratio is between 0 and
+1. On the one hand, we have that the higher the number of times that personal
income A appears, the higher the value of the ratio. On the other hand, the lower
the number of times that such an income comes up, the lower the value of the ratio
of beliefs. If the number of periods is su¢ ciently large we have that because of the
monotone likelihood ratio condition an individual that is "lazy" will obtain a higher
fraction of low income, whereas a "hard working" worker will get a higher fraction
of high incomes. Therefore, equation 13 goes to 0 for "lazy" agents, whereas for
hard-working ones goes to +1.
Now we can extend the previous result to a more general case with J di⁄erent
disutility of e⁄ort and n feasible incomes. For any type w 2 W we can split the
population in two according to their level of responsibility, with Jl = f￿1;:::;￿qg
being the "lazy" workers and Jh = f￿q+1;:::;￿Jg the "hard-working" ones. Like-
wise, we can distinguish between high levels of income xh = fxp+1;:::;xng and
low ones xl = fx1;:::;xpg. Then, applying the previous result we know that af-
ter T periods the planner can perfectly class individuals according to the previous
partitions. Once individuals are classed as either hard-working or lazy workers the
planner can make a similar analysis within each subgroup. For instance, if we fo-
cus on the h group we can also split these individuals between high hard-working
individuals Jhh = f￿q1+1;:::;￿Jg and low hard-working ones Jlh = f￿1;:::;￿q1g.
Moreover, we can make a new partition of the monetary outcomes between high
and low incomes, xh1 = fxp1+1;:::;xng and xl1 = fx1;:::;xp1g respectively. In
27such a case, due to the monotone likelihood ratio condition, it is easy to check that
p(xh1 j hh) > p(xh1 j lh), so that taking up again the results up to period T we can
class those individuals according to groups hh and lh. The same can be done for the
subset of people belonging to the lazy group. Next, we can repeat the same analysis
for the four di⁄erent subgroups. If we focus on the hh subgroup, we can di⁄eren-
tiate people in the following way: Jhhh = f￿q2+1;:::;￿Jg and Jlhh = f￿1;:::;￿q2g
and a new classi￿cation of incomes xh2 = fxp2+1;:::;xng and xl2 = fx1;:::;xp2g.
Again, it can be shown that p(xh2 j hhh) > p(xh2 j lhh), and therefore using again
the previous results the planner can use the realizations of incomes up to period T
so as to propose a thinner classi￿cation for the individuals. This could be done as
many times as the number of e⁄ort groups in which we would wish to partition the
population.
We would like to stress an usual di¢ culty that arises at the time of de￿ning
the number of cells.12 The fewer the number of cells in which the population is
partitioned, the easier to identify the cell to which individual belong. But on the
other hand, the higher the number of cells, the ￿ner the welfare evaluation of op-
portunity. Therefore, there seems to be a trade-o⁄ in the number of cells in which
the population is partitioned.
12See Peragine (2002).
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